




ALLOCATION OF IMPERFECT WEAPONS




Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Prepared for:
FEDDOCS >pecial Project Office
D 208.14/2 NPS-55TY74031 :rYStal Mali
Washington, D. C. 20390
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA




^VTJ* reported herein was ^PPorted by the Special Project OfficeCrystal Mall, Washington, D.C. 20390. U
Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized.
This report was prepared by:
UNCLASSIFIED




2. GOVT ACCESSION NO
READ INSTRUCTIONS
BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
3 RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)
ALLOCATION OF IMPERFECT WEAPONS FOR ATTACK
AND DEFENSE OF POINT TARGETS
5 TYPE OF REPORT ft PERIOD COVERED
Final
6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHORCs;
J. B. Tysver
B. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERS
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA 4 WORK UNIT NUMBERS
SSP013; TA 82415;
WR-4-5022
II. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS
Special Project Office, Crystal Mall
Washington, D. C. 20390
12. REPORT DATE
March 1974
13. NUMBER OF PAGES
62
l« MONITORING AGENCY NAME ft ADDRESSf/f dllterent from Controlling Office) 15. SECURITY CLASS, (ot thia report)
UNCLASSIFIED
15a. DECLASSIFI CATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION ST ATEMEN T (of this Report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol the abatract entered In Block 20, If different from Report)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19. KEY WORDS fConllnut on reverse aide If neceaaary and Identity by block number)
Weapon Allocation, Imperfect Weapons, Point Targets
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverae aide If neceaaary and Identity by block number)
This study investigates the effect of imperfect attack and defense weapons on
damage estimates and preferred strategies for a set of point targets. The
damage estimation model used incorporates weapon success probabilities for
both defense and attack weapons. The effect of these probabilities on
expected target damage and, subsequently, on weapon allocation preference
by both opponents are examined. A Proportional Defense Model is used for
illustration and some modification to the model proposed.
DD




SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Bntarad)

T . I NTRODUCTION.
In any conflict it is essential that the Offense assess the abilitv
of the Defense to counter an attack. The Defense capabilities depend
upon the quality as well as the quantitv of defensive weapons. The stud
discussed in this report was intended primarily to provide information
to the Offense of the effect of imperfect Defense weapons on damage esti-
mates and Offense strategies for point targets. It was motivated by
concern for target damage predictions in strategic warfare where the
defensive weapons are ABM interceptors and the offensive weapons are
Re-Entry vehicles.
Evaluation of strategics for the Offense of necessity includes con-
sideration of strategies for the Defense. Further, imperfect offensive
weapons aie also considered so that a more complete representation of a
conflict can be given. Since offensive strategies can only be evaluated
against specified defensive strategies, a Proportional Defense Model
([1] and [2]) is used to illustrate the effect of imperfect weapons on
both damage estimates and preferred weapon assignments.
This report uses general terms in order that the results be applicable
to other conflict situations.
LI. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS .
The three elements to be considered in the model used in this study
are the offensive weapons (attackers) , the defensive weapons (defenders)
,
and t lie entities which the Offense attempts to destroy and the Defense
tries to protect (targets). The model also includes attacker and defender
capabilities (success probabilities) so that interaction between Offense
and Defense can be evaluated and optimum strategies determined for each
side in a conflict.
It is assumed that, when attacked by an offensive weapon, a target
either is destroyed or is undamaged (i.e., point targets). Since stra-
tegies of the Offense and Defense are to be evaluated and these strategies
essentially consist of weapon allocations, a complex of targets T in
lumber will be considered. It will also be assumed that the i— target,
T
.
, has a value v . .
1 1
The Offense's weapons are assumed to be limited to m in number
witn each attacker having the same probability r of destroying a
target of any value if it is not intercepted by a defensive weapon. The
attacker success probability includes target susceptibility as well as
weapon reliability, accuracy, and lethal range. When more than one attacker
is assigned to a single target, no interference between attackers is con-
sidered so that statistical independence can be assumed. The Offense's
strategy consists of allocation of its attackers to specific targets thus
determining the vector
Y = (
' y l ,y 2'' * ' ,yT^
where y. is the number of attackers allocated to T. and}
i 1
T
£ y. = m.
Similarly, the Defense's weapons are assumed to be n in number
and to have, individually', the probability p of intercepting (negating)
an attack by any single offensive weapon. It is also assumed that there
is no interference when they are attempting to intercept attackers on a
common target or even when several are assigned to a single attacker,
ii is assumed that the defensive weapons must be assigned to protect
specific targets and arc not available for use against offensive weapons
attacking other targets (point defense) . Defender allocation is described
by the vector
A — IX. ,X» )• •
•
) X J
where x. is the number of defenders assigned to T. and
1 l
T
/ x . = n .
i-1
X
The Defense's strategy includes specification of X but must also specifv
assignment of the defenders against the attackers at any target.
The above assumptions provide the basis for a relatively simple
model which can be used to obtain some insight of a conflict situation
and which can be used as a basic building block for more realistic models.
The assumptions are quite restrictive and would require considerable
modification to make them descriptive of an actual conflict.
TIL. THE MODEL.
The expected survival value of a target when it lias j defenders
and k attackers will be denoted by S(j,k). When an undefended target
T. is attacked by a single offensive weapon, the probability that the
target survives the attack is (1-r) and the expected value of the
target after the attack is
S.(0,1) = v.(l-r).
If the target has a single defender, its expected survival value is
S.(l,l) = v.(l-rq)
where q = 1-p is the probability that the defender does not success-
fully intercept the attacker. If T. has x_. defenders and one attacker




S.(x.,l) = v.(l-rq X ).11 1
If, on the other hand, T. has one defender and y. attackers, then
1 ^ i '
its survival value is
yr iS.U.y,) - v,(l-rq)(l-r)
The survival value when T. has x. defenders and y. attackers11 7 i
depends not only on the magnitudes of x. and y. but also upon how
the defenders are assigned. If, for example, x. is less than y.
and each defender is assigned to a different attacker (1-on-l)
defense then
x- y. - *•
S
i (xi ,yi )
= v.(l-rq) i (l-r) i i
on the other hand, if x. is greater than y. the Defense can assign
more than one defender against at least one of the attackers. Let k
x
.
denote the greatest integral multiple of . . in x. , (k = [-— ] ) ., then
x . = ky . + i
1 J 1 J
where k and j are integers and j is less than y.. If the Defense
distributes all of its defenders as evenly as possible against the
attackers, then the survival value of the target is
S.(x.y.) = v.(l-rqK V(i-rqK )ill 1
Let a given complex of targets (T
.
; i=l,2,...,T) with their associated
values (v.; i=l,2,...,T) have n defenders assigned according to the
Defense' s assignment vector X. Where the Offense uses rn weapons distri-
buted according to its assignment vector Y, then the total expected sur-
vival value of the target complex is
T
S(X,Y) = I S (x y ).
1
From the point of view of the Offense the expected damage to the target
complex is
T
D(X,Y) = V - I S (x y ) = V - S(X,Y)
1
-
I [v.-v^x^y.)]. ^ J D.(xi)yi )
T
where D.(x.,y.) is the expected damage to target T. and V = v..ill r l .1
it will be convenient in parts of the later development to express the
expected survival and damage values of T. as the products
and
S.^.y.) = v P(z y >
VXi' y i } = V i (1-P(x i'y i )
where P(x.,y.) is the probability thai a point target survives when it
has x. defenders and y. attackers. In particular, when x. is less
1 J 1 1
than y. and 1-on-l defense is used,
x. y .-x.
P(x.,y.) = (1-rq) X (l-r) 1 X
,
IV. THE PROBLEM OF WEAPON ALLOCATION .
In allocating its n defensive weapons to the targets, the Defense
tries to maximize the total survival value S(X,Y) by selection of the
vector X. Similarly, the Offense tries to maximize the expected total
damage value D(X,Y) by selection of the vector Y. Maximization of
D(X,Y) = V - S(X,Y) is equivalent to minimization of S(X,Y) and the
problem can be treated as a Zero Sum Two-Person Game where the two oppo-
nents (Offense and Defense) select strategies (assignment vectors Y and
X, respectively).
The problem is complicated by the fact that the two opponents do
not have complete information on the strategies available to each other.
One of the important elements of information is the sizes of the opposing
forces (m and n) . Some effort has been directed to the investigation of
fractional allocation where x = y = 1 and x.y. is the proportion of
the Defense (Offense) forces allocated to the target T. ([1], Chapter A).
Another approach for the Defense is the allocation of defensive weapons
so that the target damage per offensive weapon does not: exceed a specified
value for any attack size or attacker allocation. This Defense allocation
is called Proportional Defense ([2]) and is discussed in Section 5 of this
report.
A further compounding of the Defense allocation aspect of the problem
is temporal. In general, the Defense must pre-allocate its resources
whereas the Offense can delay its allocation until the start of the attack
(Offense has last move) and hence can take advantage of any information
it can obtain on Defense allocation. Further, the Offense can mask the
total attack size y. on target T. by distributing the attack in
several groups separated in time (waves). If each attack wave on a tar-
get contains a single attacker the attack is called sequential. Propor-
tional Defense is designed specifically for sequential attacks.
In addition to its problem of allocating defenders to targets, the
Defense must also decide how to distribute its x. defenders of target




wave. If the attack on T. does not occur in a single wave, the Defense
must decide how many defenders to commit against each wave and how they
are to be distributed among the attackers in the wave. The Defense
preference for distributing defenders among the attackers in a single
wave on a target is treated in Appendix A and is relatively clear-cut.
An appropriate modification of Proportional Defense against wave attacks
is proposed in Section 6.
V. PROPORTIONAL DEFENSE CONCEPT .
A particular strategy for the Defense which can be used against any
strategy for the Offense is called Proportional Defense. It is an appro-
priate defensive strategy when the Defense has no information on the
strategy or stockpile size (number of offensive weapons). It is introduced
here both to demonstrate the effect of imperfect weapons when this
specific defensive strategy is used, and to provide a reference for the
investigation of the effect of imperfect weapons on damage estimation
and the strategies of the Offense and Defense in general.
The basic concept of Proportional Defense is defined as follows
[1]. Let A denote the attack size which exhausts the stockpile of
defenders for a set of point targets and let F denote the expected
fraction of targets destroyed by A attackers. The expected fraction
of targets destroyed by an attack of size y for y > A is denoted by
D(y). Under appropriate assumptions ([1]) this can be expressed in the
form
D(y) = F + (l-F)[l-e"a(y
"A)
]
where a is dependent upon target hardness and offensive weapon yield





_ , N ,F/A - D(y)/y.
For this defensive strategy selection, the fraction of targets destroyed
will be essentially proportional to the attack size. Further for each
target destroyed, the Offense is forced to pay a price that is proportional
to the value of that target. The payoff to the Offense in terms of
expected damage per attacker for any attack of size A or larger will
be no greater than A = F/A.
The principal is illustrated in the following sketch (Figure 1).
10









y - Attack Size
Expected Damage for Proportional Defense
FIGURE 1
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VI. A PROPORTIONAL DEFENSE MODEL .
The basic principal of Proportional Defense can be incorporated
into a Proportional Defense Model which is in a constructive form, [2],
Consider a sequential attack against a single target T.. A sequential
attack of size y. on T. is a multiple wave attack consisting of y.
waves with each wave consisting of a single attacker (y.. = 1 for the
j wave where j = l,2,...,y.). The defense of T. must be such that
for any attack size y. the payoff of the Offense in terms of expected
target value destroyed per attack weapon is no greater than a value d





" i" i *
y i
for all v.. The minimum number of defenders, x., to be assigned in
l l
defense of T. and the appropriate assignments of defenders against
each attack wave (individual attackers) must be established. A Propor-
tional Defense for T. is described below. The procedure is sequentially
constructive.
Consider the first attack wave (y = 1). The number of defenders,
x._, to be assigned to the first attacker must be such that the expected






,l) = v.[l-(l-rq U ) ] = v.rq l3",
Thus x is selected as the smallest integer such that
ll *
v.rq ^ d .
l
12
At each succeeding attack wave, the Defense considers the possibility
of reducing the number of defenders x , without violating the payoff
IK.






with x.. = x. , .-1 when j ^ k for all I ^ k, then x., = x. . ,-1.
ij i,k-l J ik i,k-l
Otherwise x = x.
,
... The construction of the defensive weapon
IK. 1 j rC— -L
assignments is illustrated in the following sketch (Figure 2) , when
x.
1
= 3. In this sketch the expected damage to the target as a function
of y. = i is
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D.(j) = d j
Construction of Defender Assignments for T.
FIGURE 2
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The defensive weapon supply is exhausted when j- offensive weapons
have been used.









When the Offense uses an attack of size y = 1 y. against a set of
1
X
targets (T T , . .
.
,T ) , the total expected damage is
T
D(X,Y) = I D (x y )
i=l
and the average expected damage per attacker is








= - V y.d(y.) ^ - I y.d = d
1
so that a Proportional Defense at each target which limits the payoff
to the Offense for that target also provides the same payoff limitation
for the entire set of targets.
Establishment of a Proportional Defense for a set of unequal valued
point targets is simple in principle although the procedure may be lengthy
and involved. Given the values of r, p, and the v.'s, the number of
defenders n and their allocation vector X can be determined for any
payoff limitation d . Note that, in particular, n is a function of
d as shown in the accompanying figure (Figure 3).




























d = payoff limitation (damage per attacker)
Proportional Defense Stockpile Requirement
FIGURE 3
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and the appropriate defense allocation vector are not so readily
determined. For example, if the defenders were assigned to targets
in proportion to the target values (i.e., x. = -r— n) unequal payoffs
^ i
could occur for the individual target attacks. Instead the Defense
must consider the total defender stockpile n as a function of d
and estimate d as an inverse function of n. To do this the Defense
can determine the number of defenders n(d ) required for specific values
of d and construct the curve representing this functional relationship.
*
For any specific value of n the appropriate value of d can be
estimated. The selected value of d can then be used to determine
the defender allocation vector X.
17
VII. APPLICATION OF PROPORTIONAL DEFENSE .
Theoretical investigations commonly assume that the maximum payoff,
d
, is actually achieved against a Proportional Defense by any attack
size. This would be true only if the defenders at each target were not
restricted to integers. A few examples will be given to illustrate this
aspect of Proportional Defense as well as some other problems of this
strategy.
For the first example consider a single target, T , with target
value V-. = 1. Let r = 0.9 and p = 0.8. A Proportional Defense for T
which limits the payoff to the Offense at d =0.1 requires x = 11
defenders to produce the following estimated damage as a function of the
number of attackers y.. assigned by the Offense to this target.
2 yl yl
1 - (1-rq ) = 1 - (.964) X ^
Y;L
^ 2





) ^ 1 - (l-rqV(l-rq) = 1 - (.9293) (.82) X 2 < y± <; 9
2 2 7 yr9 yr 9
1 - (l-rq ) a-rq)'(l-r) = 1 - (.2723)(.l) X 9 < y
±
This damage function is shown in the accompanying figure (Figure 4)
.
Two defenders are assigned against each of the first two attackers and one
defender against each of the next seven attackers. The defense of T is
then exhausted.
Three details of this defense are worthy of special comment. First,
if the Offense uses attack size x- = 5 or x = 10 the average expected
damage per attacker (payoff) is d = 0.0976 or 0.0977, respectively. On






























Proportional Defense of T.
FIGURE 4
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payoff is lower (0.0353 or 0.0854, respectively). This consequence of
integer defense increments should be considered by the Offense in select-
ing its attack size.
Second, if the Defense had information that the attack on T.. con-
sisted of more than nine attackers, then a 1-on-l defense (broken line)
would be better than a Proportional Defense for T . The third comment
pertains to the expected damage by the tenth attacker of T which is
(0.9768 - 0.7683) = 0.2083 and is greater than d . Suppose there is
another target T with value V such that 0.108 ^ V„ <. 0.2178,
then a single defender would be allocated to T„ under Proportional
Defense. If no defender were assigned to T„ , the expected damage to






Less total expected damage to the two targets would be incurred when
T is attacked by ten attackers then if the defender for T~ were shifted
to T, . These two comments demonstrate that optimality, in the sense of
minimizing expected target damage, is not necessarily achieved by
Proportional Defense either for a specific target or for a set of tar-
gets with different values.
The second example is introduced to demonstrate that a target defense
with smaller increments of contribution by defenders can approach its
-k *
continuum bound approximation D.(x.,y.) = d y.. Hence, it will be lessill l
advantageous for the Offense to attempt to select attack sizes with payoffs
close to d and to avoid attack sizes with payoffs substantially below d
.
This point is illustrated by reducing the defender success probability
20
in the first example to p = 0.5. The expected damage to T-. is
4 yl y l
1 - (1-rq ) = 1 - (0.94375)
for £ y <; 1
4.,, 3 yr L
1 - (1-rq") (1-rq") 1 - (0.94375)(.8875)
yri
for 1 < y ^5







)=/1 - (1-rq ) (l-rq J ) (1-rq ) = 1 - (0. 5855) (0. 775)
for 5 < y ^8
4 3 4 2 3 yl"
8 yl"
8
1 - (l-rq*)(l-rq J r(l-rq ) (1-rq) = 1 - (0. 2725) (0. 55)
for 8 < y <; 9
4 3 4 2 3 yl"
9 yl~ 9
1 - (l-rq )(l-rqV(l-rqV(l-rq)(l-r) = 1 - (0.1499) (.1)
for 9 < y,
and is presented graphically in Figure 5.
The third example is selected to demonstrate the effect of changing
target value or payoff. Let the success probabilities be r = 0.9 and
p = 0.8 as in the first example. The value of target T„ is also set
at v„ = 1 but the payoff limit is reduced to d 0.01. A Propor-
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1 - (l-rq 3 ) 3 = 1 - (0.9928)
<: y 3
<, 47
3,47,, 2 y 3
47














n 3.47,- 2.43 M ,
y 3
90
= 1 - (0.1472) (0.82)
' 3




3 47 2 43 2 9 yi"" y-3 _QQ(1-rqV (l-rq ) (l-rqV(l-r) J = 1 - (0.0247) (0. 1) J
99 - y Q
This expected damage is shown in Figure 6.





,y.) = vi [l-P(xi ,yi)] <; d' y.
for all attack, sizes y.. This requirement can be re-expressed in the
form
1 - P(x.,y.) S (i-)y
1
Note that if v~ = 10 and d =0.1 then the Proportional Defense
would be identical to the one presented above. Thus a Proportional
Defense for a target of any value v. can be determined by establishing
the corresponding defense for a target of unit value with the appropriate
adjustment in payoff limit. Given the success probabilities, r and p,




















Proportional Defense of T.
FIGURE 6
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valued target when the payoff limit has specified value. The curve
constructed from this data is similar to that in Figure 3 and can be
used to estimate the defense requirements x. for each target T.
•k
in any target set and specified payoff limit d . The total number of
defensive weapons n = £ x. and associated d provide the inputs to be
1
X
used as in Section VI (see Figure 3).
2.S
VIII. PROPORTIONAL DEFENSE AGAINST A WAVE ATTACK.
The Proportional Defense Model designed for use against a sequential
attack on a target can be modified to make it applicable against a wave
attack. Suppose a wave attack on T. occurs in K waves with x
-/^\
attackers in the K wave with the size and number of subsequent attack
waves unknown to the Defense. If any attack wave contains attackers for
which only one or two defense levels (number of defenders per attacker) would
be committed under Proportional Defense then that defense is appropriate.
However, if three or more defense levels would be used, then the Defense's
capability can be improved by allocating the same total number of defenders
as uniformly as possible against the attackers in the wave. This is in
accord with the principle described in Appendix A.
To illustrate this modification consider the situation in the second
example with a first attack wave of size y , ,= 6. Proportional Defense
would assign four defenders against one of the attackers, three defenders
against each of four attackers, and two defenders against the remaining




If the 18 defenders are divided equally among the attackers with three
defenders assigned to each, the expected damage is
D^(23,6) = 1 - (1-rq 3 )
6
= 0.5114.
From the Defense's point of view, wave attacks would be preferable
to a sequential attack of the same size since there is the possibility
of balancing the defense within each wave and thus reducing the expected
damage. From the Offense's point of view, any attack on a target should
26
be distributed in small waves so that the Defense cannot achieve this
reduction. It should be recognized, however, that the validity of these
strategies for both the Defense and Offense is a consequence of the
assumptions used in establishing the model. Further, practical consider-
ations may limit the capability of either side of a conflict from taking
advantage of the potentially beneficial modifications.
27
IX. WEAPON ALLOCATION FOR TWO TARGETS .
The preceding sections of this report dealt primarily with
Proportional Defense. Some indication of the effect of imperfect
weapons on preferred weapon allocations can be demonstrated by examining
a conflict situation involving only two targets. The results established
here would be applicable when either opponent had information on the opposi-
tion's weapon allocation to the targets.
Consider two targets, T and T , of equal value, v = v = 1.
When the Defense and Offense use weapon allocations X = (x x ) = (i,j) and
Y = (y, ,y 9 ) = (k,£), respectvely, the expected survival values of T 1 and T

















The investigation will determine preferred weapon allocations for
each opponent given specific allocations by the opposition. When the
opposition's allocation is specified, the notation can be simplified
by deleting them in the corresponding symbol. Thus, when Y = (k,£)






to indicate the dependence on the defensive allocation X = (i,j)
Similarly, when X = (i,j) the total expected damage is
28
D(k,Jl) = 2 - S^i.k) - S
2
(j,i).
to indicate the dependence on the attack allocation Y = (k,Z)
For given Y = (k,£), the Defense wants to divide its available number
of defenders, n, so as to maximize S(i,j) with i + j = n. The
Offense, on the other hand, for given X = (i,j) and specified number
of attackers, m, wants to maximize D(k,£) with k + I = m.
29
X. DEFEASE OF TWO TARGETS .
Preferred defensive weapon allocations against several specific
attacker allocations are outlined in Appendix B. One of these is des-
cribed here. Let Y = (1,2) and n = 3. The total survival values for




























(3,2) = (1-r) + (1-rq
2
) (1-rq)
Wow consider the differences in survival values. Since
S(l,2) - S(0,3) = rp[p + r (1-p) 2 ]
and is positive for all probabilities r and p, the defender allocation
X = (0,3) can be eliminated. The other differences are





S(2,l) - S(l,2) = rp(r-rp-p) £ when r ^ r^ E r , and1-p
2
S(3,0) - S(l,2) = rp(2r(2r-rp+p 2 -3p) ^ when r £ 3P~P = r '
.
Note that, when p = 0.382 the three conditions have the common value
A AA AAA
r = r = r = 0.613. If p <. 0.382, the preferred defender allocations
are
30
(3,0) when r £ r
X = ( (2,1) when r ^ r ^ r
(1,2) when r • r
If p 0.382 the preferred allocations are
•k-ki<
(3,0) when r 2; r
(1.2) when r • r
The relationship between preferred defense allocation and the success
probabilities r and p is shown in Figure 7.
Preferred defensive allocations and the corresponding total survival
values are presented in Table 1 for a few limited attack allocations,
Y=(k,V), and Defense stockpiles, n. Only one attacker success proba-
bility, r = 0.9, is included but a range of defender success probabi-
lities is used to demonstrate the shift in preferred defensive allocation
with this parameter. The table is only partially filled but gives an
indication of the effect of p on the allocation preference for the
Defense. Some general defensive allocation procedures can be developed
as indicated below.
Consider a balanced attack, Y = (k,k) on the two targets. Suppose
that the defensive allocation is X = (i,j) with i ^ j < k, and an
additional defender is to be allocated to one of the targets. If the






,. vi+l/ n vk-i-1 ,. vj /n xk-j




















































































P = 0.7 ,. p =0,9 p = 1.0
Surv. Pref.X Surv. Pref.X Surv. Pref.X Surv.



























(2.1) 1.649 (2,1) 1.901
(2.2) 1.838 (2,2) 1.982





















(2,2) (0,0) .02 .02 .02 .02 .02
1 (1,0) .05 (1,0) .07 (1,0) .08 (1,0) .10 (1,0) .11
2 (2,0) .147 (2,0) .312 (2,0) .407 (2,0) .838 (2,0) 1.01
3 (3,0) .217 (3,0) | .436 (3,0) .589 (2,1) .919 (2,1) 1.1











/1 x i /1 N k-i ,.. N j+1 s k-j-l
= (1-rq) (1-r) + (l-rq) J (1-r) J ,
The difference in survival values is
A S = S(i,j+1) - S(i+l,j)
= rp(l-rq) j (l-r) k_j
" 1 [l-(^-) ].
Since (1-r) ^ (1-rq), this difference is positive for all values
of the probabilities r and q. The additional defender should be
assigned to the target (T„ in this case) which already has the largest
number of defenders. Thus the first k defenders should all be, assigned
to the same target.
Next, suppose that the first k defenders have been assigned to
st
T when the attack is Y = (k,k). To which target should an (k+1)
defender be assigned? If it is assigned to T-
,






= (l-rq)(l-r) k_1 + (l-rq) k
and, if it is assigned to T
,
S(0,k+1) = S-^O.k) + S
2
(k+l,k)




A S = S(l,k) - S(0,k+1)
= rp[(l-r) k l - q(l-rq) k 1 ]




If k = 1, this will be positive for all r and p and the additional
defender should be assigned to T, . If, however, k 1 then the
assignment preference will depend upon k as well as r and p.
To generalize this, let T_ have k defenders and T have i
defenders where ^ i < k, where the attack is Y = (k,k) . To which
target should an additional defender be assigned? The expected survival
values are
S(i+l,k) = S 1 (i+l,k) + S 2 (k,k)
= (l-rq) i+1 (l-r) k_i X + (l-rq) k and
S(i,k+1) = S (i,k) + S
2
(k+l,k)
= (l-rq) i (l-r) k 1 + (l-rq 2 )(l-rq) k X
,
The difference is
A S = S(i+l,k) - S(i,k+1)
rp(l-rq) i [(l-r) k i X - q(l-rq) k i_1 ]
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and will be positive when
/i \k-i-l - /i vk-i-1(1-r) ^ q(l-rq)
If i = k-1 this inequality will be satisfied for all k, r, and p
and the additional defender should be assigned to T.. giving both
targets k defenders. If, however, i k-1, then the preferred
assignment will depend upon (k-i) as well as upon r and p.
The above development of preferred defensive allocation against
a balanced attack, Y = (k,k), can be extended to situations in which
the stockpile for the Defense is greater than that for the Offense.
Consider a defensive allocation X = (i,j) where
i=ak+b<j=ak+c
with a, b, and c being integers and b < c. The expected survival
values for T.. and T„ are
S
1




















a+lvb+1,., a N k-b-l , /n a+l.c.. a x k-c
= (1-rq ) (1-rq ) + (1-rq ) (1-rq ) ,
S(i,j+1) = S^i.k) + S
2
(j+l,k)
,,, a+l.b,, a N k-b , n a+l.c+l /n a.k-c-1
= (1-rq ) (1-rq ) + (1-rq ) (1-rq )
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The difference is
A S = S(i,j+1) - S(i+l,j)
a. a N k-c-l /1 a+l N b r/ a+l N c-b ,. a.c-b,
= rpq (1-rq ) (1-rq ) [ (1-rq ) - (1-rq ) ].
This will be positive for all probability values, r and p. Thus when
two equal valued targets have the same number (k) of attackers and are
defended by numbers of defenders (i and j) which are within the same
multiple (a) of the attackers, then additional defenders should be
assigned to the target which already has the greatest number of defenders.
Note that, for a - 0, this includes the situation i < j < k pre-
viously considered. This concentration of Defense resources is the con-
verse of the balancing of resources against multiple attackers on a single
target described in Appendix A.
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XI. ATTACK ON TWO TARGETS .
As in the defense of a target pair, the preferred offensive weapon
allocation can be established for attack on two point targets when the
defensive allocation (X = (x-jX^)) and the total attack size (m) is
specified. This is outlined in Appendix C for a few limited defensive
allocations and attack sizes. Some of the results are summarized in
Table 2. This Table, like Table 1, is only partially completed as its
purposes are to aid in the search for general offensive strategies and
to demonstrate the effect of the success probabilities on the selection
of preferred offensive strategies.
Although the specific cases presented in Apprendix C are not very
extensive, they do indicate a somewhat more complex structure for the
relationship between preferred attacker allocations and success proba-
bilities than was apparent in the corresponding relationship for preferred
defender allocations. Tentative conclusions to be drawn are that the
attackers should concentrate on one target (the most lightly defended
of two equal-valued point targets if there is unequal defense) and to
allocate attackers to the other target when the expected damage to the
first target is near unity. This is indicated in Table 2 with higher
concentrations on the first target being required when the attacker
success probability is low (e.g., r = 0.3).
The results obtained in Appendix C can also be used to examine the
effect of defender success probability on attacker allocation preference.
Table 3 contains this information.
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TABLE 2




























Pref. Y : Damage
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.07 (1,0) .09 (1,0) .10
.721 (2,0) .909 (2,0) 1.0
.916 (3,0) .991 (2,1) 1.1
























Two-Target Attack Allocation Against Specified Defense
r = 0.9
































































Derivation of general attack allocation principles is more difficult
than the derivation of principles for defensive allocation. This is a
consequence of the fact that the addition of a single attacker for one
target can require substantial modification of defender assignments for
that target. For example, if a target has one attacker and ten defenders
and an additional attacker is allocated to it, then the defense is shifted
from 10-on-l to 5-on-l using the principle presented in Appendix A where-
as an additional defender allocated to the target would merely change
the defense from 10-on-l to 11-on-l. Nevertheless, some principles can
be established.
Consider a pair of equal-valued targets with defense X = (k,k+l)
and let the attack size be m = 2i where k - i. If the attack is
balanced, y = (i,i), then the expected total damage is





2 - (l-rq) k (l-r) i_k - (l-rq) k+1 (1-r) i
"k_1
If an additional attacker is available and is assigned to the first target
(T
1
) then the expected total damage is
D(i+l,i) = 2 - S (k,i+l) - S (k+l,i) =
2 - (l-rq) k (l-r) i+1 k - (l-rq) k+1 (1-r) i_k 2
If the additional attacker is assigned to T_, then










The difference in expected damage is
D(i,i+1) - D(i+l,i) - r p(l-rq) (1-r)
1
^ for all r ,p.
Thus the additional attacker should be assigned to T„ and the attacker
allocation Y = (i,i+l) is preferred to Y = (i+l,i).
Suppose another additional attacker is available. For Y = (i+l,i+l)
the expected target damage is





_ ,- .k /1 vi+l-k ,, \k+l,, vi-k2 - (1-rq) (1-r) - (1-rq) (1-r)
and for Y = (i,i+2) it is





_ .. N k, n N i-k ., vk+1,- vi+l-k2 - (1-rq) (1-r) - (1-rq) (1-r)
The difference is
D(i+l,i+l) - D(i,i+2) = r 2q(l-rq) k (l-r) 1 k
^ for all r,p.
The attacker allocation Y = (i+l,i+l) is preferred to Y = (i,i+2).
The generalization just derived is applicable when the Offense is
numerically superior to the Defense. Under this condition a further
generalization is possible. Consider a defensive allocation X = (k,£)
and an offensive allocation Y = (i,j) where k <. I < i ^ j. With an
additional attacker, the Offense must choose between Y = (i+l,j) and
Y = (i, j+1) . The expected damage values are
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and





2 - (l-rq) k (l-r) i+1 k - (1-rq) ' (1-r) j
"











D(i,j+1) - D(i+l,j) = r(l-rq) V-r) J - r (l-rq) k (l-r) i k ,
u = min [ (i-k) , (j-£) ] ,











= U-k) - (j-i).
The difference then becomes
w w
D(i,j+1) - D(i+l,j) = r(l-rq) 5
"k (l-r)
U [(l-rq)
V: "k (l-r) X - (1-r) 2 ]
-> n u n ^"k > ri v(A-k) - (j-i)^ when (1-rq) ^ (1-r)
The conditional inequality for Y(i,j+1) to be preferred over Y(i+l,j)




1 - r <. 1 - rq
so that both sides of the conditional inequality are integral powers of
numbers which are less than unity.
Some general comments on the inequality are in order. When i = j
and k < £ the inequality holds for all r and p and the Offense will
prefer Y = (i,j+l) to Y = (i+l,j). Also, if j - i = I - k the
inequality does not hold and Y = (i+l,j) is preferred to Y = (i,j+l).
Since (l-r)/(l-rq) <. (1-r) , the exponent (£-k) must be larger than
(j-1) for the inequality to hold. In general, if the Defense is fairly
well balanced ((£-k) is small) the Offense should tend toward a balanced
attack (assign additional attackers to the target with the fewest
attackers). The inequality demonstrates the dependence of attacker
allocation on the success probabilities r and p as well as the target
allocations i,j,k, and I.
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XII. DJ SCUSS LON AND CONCLUSIONS
.
For a set of point targets, the effect ot imperfect weapons on
target damage and weapon allocation preferences is quite clear. How
much use this theory will be in application to a realistic situal ion
is another question. Either side in a confLict must establish values
for the point targets and for the weapon success probabilities
r and p. In addition, the opponents weapon allocation must hi- known.
When the Proportional Defense Model can be presumed the Offense needs
to know the defensive payoff limitation and the Defense's specification
of target values. With this information, the Offense can estimate the
Defense's weapon allocation.
In the description of the Proportional Defense Model (Section VI),
the average expected damage per attacker (payoff to the Offense) is
implicitly assumed to be an appropriate measure of effectiveness. This
requirement that the payoff be limited for any attack size is somewhat
unrealistic. The Defense should not be overly concerned about small
attack sizes for which the total expected damage is not great even though
the payoff exceeds the prescribed limit. This can be illustrated for
Example 2. When the Defense assigns only three defenders against the
first attacker and leaves the remainder of the defense o( target T
unchanged, the situation will be as shown in Figure 8. U an expected
damage of 0.3009 or less is not catastrophic to the overall defense of
the set of targets or if it can be assumed that the Offense will not con-
sider a damage level this low as acceptable, then the Defense can elimi-
nate the additional defender and still achieve a Proportional Defense
with the same payoff limitation against larger size attacks.
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QUALIFIED PROPORTIONAL DEFENSE OF T.
FIGURE 8
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The restriction of payoff limitation to attacks of size large
enough to produce damage greater than some specified damage level does
not conform to the Proportional Defense Model described in Section VI
but is consistent with the principle of Proportional Defense as des-
cribed in Section V. For Example 2, both the Proportional Defense Model
solution and its modification by deletion of a defender specify an
attack by nine attackers as exhaustive and limit the payoff to the Offense
to d 0.1 for attacks of this size or larger. The strict Propor-
tional Defense Model has this limitation on payoff for all attack sizes
whereas with the modification this payoff limitation holds only for
attack sizes of four or larger with expected damage greater than 0.3009.
If the Defense can determine a damage level D such that the payoff
limitation is required only for attack sizes which produce damage levels
k
exceeding D
, then some reduction in the Defenses resources from the
requirements for the Proportional Defense Model will be possible. The
proposed modification can be called a Qualified Proportional Defense
Model with the qualification consisting of specification of the minimum
damage level D
,
for which the payoff limitation will be required.
Reservations about the usefulness of the model described in this
report pertain principally to the assumptions used in establishing the model
Jn addition to the assumptions which eliminate interactions (e.g., no
interference between defenders of a given target) the model is res-
tricted to point targets. Considerable extension or reformulation of the
model is required to make it applicable to area targets. For this
important class of targets, a single attacker cannot, in general, destroy
the entire target area and the simple dichotomy that the target is either
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completely destroyed or undamaged by the attacker is no longer appropriate.
Thus, there is a dependence of expected damage by any one attacker on the
expected damage by preceding attackers of the same target which must be
considered.
A substantial development of damage estimates for area targets using
statistical distributions is available in the literature [1], Attacker
accuracy and lethal range are considerably but attacker reliability is not
included in damage estimation procedure. In extension of the model for
point targets to area targets, it appears to be essential to separate
these contributors to the attacker success probability which lead to a
substantially more complicated model.
In summary, it can be asserted that, as would be expected, weapon
success probabilities have a considerable effect on target damage
estimates and hence, on preferred weapon assignments by both Defense and
Offense. As a general principle the Defense should distribute its
defenders of a given target against the attackers of that target as uni-
formly as possible regardless of the weapon success probabilities. The
Defense should, however, concentrate defender allocations to individual
targets to maximize expected target survival values with the extent of
the concentration being highly dependent upon the weapon success proba-
bilities. General principles for weapon allocation by the Offense are
more difficult to establish. Limited investigation does, however, indi-
cate that the Offense should tend toward a balanced attack on targets of
equal value when it has more weapons than the Defense.
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APPENDIX A
Target Defense Against An Attack Wave
Suppose the Defense has x.. defenders to be used against y
ij 6 7 ij
attackers in the j— attack wave on T.. The defenders are to be
distributed against the attackers so as to maximize the expected target
survival value
V..(x..,y. .) = V. . P(x. .,y. .)ij 13 13 i,J-l 13 13
where V
. .
, is the expected survival value of the target after thei,3-l
st
(j-1) attack wave. This is accomplished when P(x..,y..) is maximized
by the appropriate defender allocation.









ij' y ij }
= (1_rq) lj(1" r) ^
lj
-
If a single defender is shifted from one attacker to provide a 2-on-l
defense against one attacker, then the survival probability becomes
„ y..-x..+l
?




ij' y ij }
= d-rq )(l-rq) 1J U
" r;









ij' y ij }




and is positive for all probabilities r and q. Additional shifts will
produce a similar result. A 1-on-l defense is preferred in this case.
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where k is an integer greater than zero and I is an integer less
than Y... When the defenders are distributed as evenly as possible
(k+1 defenders against each of £ attackers and k defenders against
each of the remaining y.. - I attackers) the probability that the
.th ,
target survives the j— attack wave is





ij' y ij }
= ( q } ( q }
*
If a defender is shifted from an attacker with a k-on-1 defense to an




(x..,y..) = (l-rqk+2)(l-rqk+1 )
£"1 (l-rqk) iJ (l-rq
1^1
).







ij' y ij } " p 2 (xij' y ij }
= (1_rq } (1" r) 1J rq d-qXi-q ).
This quantity is positive for all probabilities r and q. Attempts to
shift defenders further from this balanced defender allocation produce
similar results also.
From the above analysis it can be seen that the preferred defender
allocation against an attack wave distributes the defenders as evenly as




Preferred Defense Against Attack. Y = (y ,y )
Y = (1,1)





(n-l,l) = (1-rq 1 ) + (l-rq"" 1 )
S(i+1, n-i-1) = S-Ci+1,1) + S (n-i-1) - (l-rq 1+1 ) + (l-rq
11" 1" 1
;





r\ i • n-l






S(1,0) = (1-rq) + (1-r)
S(l,l) = 2(l-rq)
S(2,l) = (1-rq2 ) + (1-rq)
S(2,2) = 2(l-rq2 )
S(3,2) = (1-rq3 ) + (1-rq
2
)





















(l,2) = (1-r) + (1-rq) (1-r)
Difference in Survival Values
S(1,0) - S(0,1) = r
2
p £ for all r,p
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Preferred Defense Allocation X = (1,0)
n = 2
Total Survival Values
S(2,0) = (1-rq 2 ) + (1-r
2
), S(l,l) = (1-rq) + (1-rq) (1-r)
S(0,2) = (1-r) + (1-rq) 2
Differences in Survival Values
S(l,l) - S(0,2) = r 2pq > for all r,p,
S(2,0) - S(l,l) = rp(r-p)
Preferred Defense Allocation
X =
I (1,1) when r > p
/ (2,0) when r < p
n = 3
Total Survival Values
S(3,0) = (1-rq 3 ) + (1-r)
2
,
S(2,l) = (1-rq 2 ) + (1-rq) (1-r)
S(l,2) = (1-rq) + (1-rq 2 ), S(0,3) = (1-r) + (1-rq
2
) (1-rq)
Differences in Survival Values
S(l,2) - S(0,3) = rp(p+rq2 ) > for all r,p
2 2 *
S(3,0) - S(2,l) = rp(r-2p+p ) > when r > 2p - p = r
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S(2,l) - S(l,2) = rp(r-rp-p) > when r * -*- r
1-p
2
S(3,0) - S(l,2) = rp(2r-rp+p -3p) > when r > &$- = r
2-p
<fc 'iz'ii Vc *~c <fe
(Note that r = r ' = r = 0.618 when p = 0.382)
Preferred Defense Allocation
if p < 0.382
(1,2) when r < r
X = \ (2,1) when r £ r < r
(3,0) when r ^ r
if 0.382
X =
( (1,2) when r < r




Total Survival values S(4,0), S(3,l), S(2,2), S(l,3), S(0,4)
Differences in Survival Values
2
S(l,3) - S(0,4) = rp(p+rq ) > for all r,p
S(2,2) - S(l,3) = r 2 pq 2 ^ for all r,p
S(4,0) - S(3,l) = rp(r-l+q3 ) 2 when r > 1-q 3 = r*
2
S(3,l) - S(2,2) = rp(rq-l+q ) > when r ^ =Z^- = r
2
S(4,0) - S(2,2) = rp[r(2-p) - p(5-4p+p 2 )] > when r > P(5 "^P+P }
kkk
= r
(r = r = r =0.576 when p = 0.248)
Preferred Defense Allocation
if p < 0.248
(2,2) when r < r
kk
X =
if p > 0.248




(3,1) when r < r < r
(4,0) when r < r
***










S(2,0) - S(l,l) = rp
2





S(3,0) = (1-rq 2 ) (1-rq) + (1-r)
2








(3.0) when r £ r









S(3,l) = (1-rq 2 ) (1-rq) + (1-rq) (1-r)
S(2,2) = 2(l-rq) 2
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Differences
S(2,2) - S(3,l) = rp 2 (l-rq) > for all r,p
2








(4,0) when r > r
i




Preferred Attack Against Defense X = (x ,x )
Total expected damage when attack is Y = (i,j) with i + j = m










D(2,0) = r(l+q-rq), D(l,l) = 2rq
D(2,0) - D(l,l) = r[p(l+r)-r] ;> when p a -~ = p
Preferred Attack Allocation
(2.0) when p ^ p
(1.1) when p < p
m = 3
D(3,0) = 1 - (l-rq)(l-r) 2 , D(2,l) = r(l+2q-rq)







(3.0) when p > p
(2.1) when p < p
m = 4
D(4,0) = 1 - (l-rq)(l-r) 3 , D(3,l) = 2 - (l-rq)(l-r)
2
- (1-rq)
D(2,2) = 2 - 2(l-rq)(l-r)
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D(2,2) - D(3,l) - r 2 (l-rq) * for all r,p




^ when p > * * = p
(1-r) (l+2r-r )
Preferred Attack Allocation
(4,0) when p > p
3
(2,2) when p < p
X = (1,2)
m = 2
D(2,0) = r(l+q-rq), D(l,l) = rq(l+q), D(0,2) = rq(2-rq)
D(2,0) - D(0,2) = rp(l-rq) > for all r,p
D(2,0) - D(l,l) = r[(l-q2 ) " rq]
2





(2.0) when r ^ r
(1.1) when r > r
m = 3
D(3,0) = 1 - (l-rq)(l-r) 2 , D(2,l) = 2 - (1-rq) (1-r) - (1-rq
2
)
D(l,2) = 2 - (1-rq) - (1-rq) 2 , D(0,3) = 1 - (l-rq)
2 (l-r)
D(3,0) - D(0,3) = rp(l-r)(l-rq) > for all r,p
D(3,0) - D(2,l) = r[(l-rq)(l-r)-q 2 ] = rl
±
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D(3,0) D(l,2) - (l-rq)[l + (1-rq) (1-r) ]
D(2,l) - DQ-2) = rp[p(l-r) r] - rpi
5










(4 - 1 - (1-rq) (1-r)
3
,
D(3,l) 2 / 1 „_./--u ro, x- - (1-rc )
D(2
r
2 (l-rq)Q--r) - (1 ^ J 3 - fl-ra'i - fl-rc
r» /)<0,4^ -- 1 - (1-rq) (1-r)
D(2,2) - D'1.3) - r q(l-rq] lor all r,p
D(4.0) D(0,4) - rp(l-rq) (1-r) ' _ Tor all r,p





D(3,l) - D(2,2) - r(l-r)U-rq) + (1-rq) 2 - (1-rq 2 ) - f,




when f 0, f
when f 0, f.
f n -> , when f 0, f
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X = (1,2) m = 3
> P





[1] Eckler, A. R. and Burr, S. A. "Mathematical Models of Target
Coverage and Missile Allocation, Military Operations
Research Society, 1972.
[2] Howard, G. T. and Shumate, K. C. "A Proportional Defense Model,"
Naval Research Logistic Quarterly, March 74, V21, #1
.
[3| Matlin, S., "A Review of the Literature on the Missile Allocation




Department of Management Sciences





Indian Head, Maryland 20640

























Defense Documentation Center 12
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
Dean of Research 1
Naval Postgrauduate School
Monterey, California 93940
Library Code 0212 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
Library, Code 55 3




CDR Angelo Ciccolani 6
Strategic Systems Project Office
Crystal Mall
Washington, D. C. 20390
Naval Research Laboratory 1
Washington, D. C. 20390
Naval Ship Research and 1
Development Center
Washington, D. C. 20034
Naval Undersea Research and 1
Development Center
San Diego, California 92132
Robert Miller 1
Office of Naval Research
Arlington, Virginia 22217
Thomas Varley 1
Office of Naval Research
Arlington, Virginia 22217
Naval Weapons Center 1








Silver Spring, Maryland 20910

U159945
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY - RESEARCH REPORTS
u
5 6853 01057971 7
